PublishedHelion & Company, April 2023 |
ISBN9781804510209 |
FormatSoftcover, 88 pages |
Dimensions29.8cm × 21cm |
After an uneven start in 1966 by January 1967 General Westmoreland was finally ready to launch his own offensives in the area north of Saigon. What followed was a series of controversial battles. This book explores these battles and puts them in the larger context of US strategy in Vietnam.
Until recently these operations had been largely portrayed by historians as failures that did not further US aims in Vietnam, yet after Westmoreland's large scale offensive enemy activity in the region declined sharply. This new analysis looks at them using more recent scholarship, debunks several myths and ties them to the overall, and often misunderstood, strategy applied by General Westmoreland. The book provides the reader with a nuanced analysis of battles and strategy bringing a fresh perspective not only on the US Army in the Vietnam War and General Westmoreland's strategy, but also at the broader subject of 'limited wars' and 'counterinsurgencies'.
